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Introduction
Imagine holding the same job over the past thirty years without ever once receiving a raise. What 
if that job required you to pay for many of the associated costs of doing business, like buying your 
own computer and carrying professional insurance? The cumulative rate of inflation has increased 
by 130% since 1984,1 meaning that your business expenses have increased substantially – steadily 
decreasing your take home pay since you first started working. The cost alone to fill your car with 
gas would have more than tripled over that time period.2
Now imagine that twenty years ago you were forced to take a 20% pay cut with no further increas-
es. 
Regardless of the profession, the quality of the work being performed under such a financial ar-
rangement will always be questioned. Wherever and whenever the level of compensation creates a 
financial conflict between a worker’s take home pay and the resources needed to do the job right 
a number of potential impacts may result. Good workers will leave to take on more profitable 
endeavors. Those that remain will often do everything in their power to increase their take home 
pay by cutting costs of doing business wherever they can. Inexperienced people may also jump at 
the chance to get on-the-job training, as a trade-off for the inadequate income provided, raising 
doubts that the job being done is up to minimally effective standards. 
The example above is not a hypothetical. It describes the financial conflicts imposed on Wisconsin 
lawyers representing poor people charged with crime and, in turn, the significant flaws in how the 
state of Wisconsin attempts to uphold its obligations under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Attorneys defending the indigent accused are paid $40 per hour, a rate that 
has not changed since 1995 when the Wisconsin legislature reduced the rate from $50 per hour.3 
1 This calculation was determined using the Consumer Price Index published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
between January 1984 and January 2015 using the inflationdata.com calculator at: http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/
Inflation_Calculators/Cumulative_Inflation_Calculator.aspx. (Last visited March 2015.)
2 The average national price of gas in 1984 was $1.16 per gallon. In 2013, it was $3.53, an increase of 204%. U.S. 
Department of  Energy. See: http://energy.gov/eere/vehicles/fact-835-august-25-average-historical-annual-gaso-
line-pump-price-1929-2013 (Last visited March 2015). Rates beyond 2013 not yet posted.
3 Wis. Stat. §977.08 (4m)(c).
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The current $40-per-hour rate, as noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2011, is “only $5 
more per hour than the original rate established in 1978.”4
Although $40 per hour may sound like a lot of money to the average person trying to make ends 
meet in tough economic times, it is not given the requirements of representing accused persons. 
The up-front costs required to maintain and operate a law practice in Wisconsin – commonly 
referred to as “overhead expenses” – are many, including, but not limited to: office rent, telecom-
munications, utilities, support staff, accounting, bar dues, legal research services, business travel, 
and professional liability insurance. 
As a means of comparison, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined, in a case challenging the 
state’s assigned counsel compensation rate, that private attorneys representing indigent criminal 
defendants are entitled to a reasonable hourly fee in addition to overhead expenses.5 During hear-
ings on the matter, the Mississippi Court took testimony from the Mississippi Sate Bar Associa-
tion that set the average overhead rate at $34.86 per hour (or 87% of the total hourly rate paid in 
Wisconsin). Consider the cost of living difference between, for example, Madison and the Missis-
sippi Delta,6 and then consider that the Mississippi case challenging public defense compensation 
is now nearly 25 years old. In other words, the assigned counsel rate today for Wisconsin lawyers 
today barely covers the basic costs of keeping a law practice open in Mississippi in 1990.
Imagine if it was your son or daughter facing potential incarceration and his or her freedom de-
pended on an attorney toiling under such financial restraints.
That Wisconsin’s compensation rate for Sixth Amendment lawyers is the lowest in any state in the 
country is undisputed. In 2013, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) 
published a comprehensive study entitled, Rationing Justice: the Underfunding of Assigned Coun-
sel Systems, that details the hourly rates of compensation for appointed counsel in all fifty states.7 
Generally calling the low compensation rates afforded to lawyers across America a “serious threat 
to our criminal justice system,” NACDL pegs Wisconsin as the state offering the “lowest rate in 
the nation.”8
This report takes the NACDL conclusion as its starting point and does not try to reduplicate their 
efforts to prove the already-proven – that Wisconsin pays Sixth Amendment attorneys the lowest 
hourly rate in the country. Instead, this report seeks to achieve two aims:
4 In the matter of the petition to amend Supreme Court Rule 81.02, July 6, 2011, available at: https://www.wicourts.
gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=67390. (Last visited March 2015.)
5 Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338 (Miss. S.Ct., 1990).
6 The U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012, reports that the cost of living in Madison, 
Wisconsin was 9.8% above the national average in 2010, while Tupelo, Mississippi was 11.6% below the same national 
composite index for the same year. See: https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0728.pdf. (Last 
visited March 2015.)
7 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Rationing Justice: the Underfunding of Assigned Counsel Sys-
tems. March 2013. Available at: https://www.nacdl.org/gideonat50/. (Last visited March 2015.)
8 Ibid, page 12.
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1. To explain whether the manner in which Sixth Amendment lawyers are paid in Wis-
consin is in violation of recognized national standards of justice; and,
2. To explain the impact the low compensation rate is having on the constitutional right to 
counsel in Wisconsin. 
The Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL)9 commissioned the Sixth 
Amendment Center (6AC), in cooperation with the Defender Initiative at Seattle University 
School of Law (SUSL), to conduct the report.10
As part of this study, the authors of this report conducted a statewide survey of criminal defense 
lawyers. To emphasize research findings, survey responses are highlighted throughout the report.
The Structure of Indigent Defense in Wisconsin
The fear of government unduly taking a person’s liberty led the United States Supreme Court in 
1963 to unanimously declare it to be an “obvious truth”11 that the indigent accused cannot receive 
a fair trial against the “machinery”12 of law enforcement unless a lawyer is provided to him at no 
cost. “The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and es-
sential to fair trials in some countries,” the Court announced in Gideon v. Wainwright, “but it is in 
ours.”13 Accordingly, Gideon made it incumbent upon states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
to provide Sixth Amendment right to counsel services to any person of limited means facing a 
possible loss of liberty at the hands of the criminal justice system.14
In the immediate wake of the Gideon decision, the Wisconsin legislature created the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender (SPD) in 1965. Created first as a system to provide counsel in post-con-
viction appeals, the legislature transformed the SPD in 1979 into an independent state agency to 
9 The Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL) is a membership organization of more than 
400 private attorneys and public defenders practicing criminal law across the state. WACDL provides support and 
training to criminal defense attorneys statewide and promotes the proper administration of criminal justice.
10 The 6AC is a Massachusetts-based non-profit organization that measures right to counsel services against es-
tablished standards of justice. When shortcomings are identified, the 6AC provides technical assistance to state and 
county policymakers to make their courts systems fairer for accused indigents in ways that promote public safety 
and fiscal responsibility. In 2013, the 6AC formed a partnership with the Defender Initiative of the Fred T. Koremat-
su Center for Law and Equality at Seattle University School of Law (SUSL Defender Initiative). The SUSL Defender 
Initiative is a law school-based project aimed at providing better representation for people accused of crimes through 
a unified vision that combines research, advocacy, and education.
11 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Gideon established the right to counsel in felony proceedings. In the intervening 50+ years, the Supreme Court 
has extended the promise of Gideon to any case in which a defendant may potentially lose their liberty. The Gideon 
mandate now extends to: direct appeals [Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)]; juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings [In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)]; misdemeanors [Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)]; misdemeanors with 
suspended sentences [Shelton v. Alabama, 505 U.S. 654 (2002)]; and appeals challenging a sentence as a result of a 
guilty plea [Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005)].
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provide direct trial-level right to counsel services in all counties. Today, primary indigent defense 
services are provided by government staff attorneys working in 35 local public defender offices to 
handle trial-level services, plus another two offices for appellate work, all overseen by the system’s 
central administration in Madison. The state public defender serves as the system’s chief attorney, 
appointed by a nine-person commission, and responsible for carrying out the commission’s poli-
cies and directives.
But of course not all people who stand accused before Wisconsin’s courts receive the benefit of the 
primary public defender system. For example, a public defender office generally cannot ethical-
ly represent people charged as co-defendants in the same crime because the interests of one of 
the accused could directly conflict with the interests of the other. Just think of one co-defendant 
pointing a finger at the other as being more culpable of the crime they are both accused of having 
committed. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is an individual right. The state of Wisconsin 
owes the same level of minimally effective representation to each and every defendant regardless 
if an individual is deemed co-defendant #1 or #2.
So the SPD is also responsible for overseeing the representation of conflict defendants, through 
a separate division set apart from the primary system through ethical screens (i.e., substantive 
information about conflict cases is kept apart between the primary staff public defenders and the 
conflict private attorneys). Despite being the secondary system of representation, conflict ap-
pointed counsel represent a significant number of the indigent accused. There are approximately 
60,000 appointed cases per year,15 a number that is expected to grow in coming years because of 
fairly recent changes to the criteria by which a defendant is deemed indigent.16 It is this conflict 
assigned counsel system that is the focus of the current report.
National Assigned Counsel Compensation Standards 
The use of standards in criminal justice is not a new concept for government officials. After all, for 
many decades policymakers have ordered minimum safety standards in all proposals to build a 
brand new courthouse, a new state highway overpass, or even to redo the electrical wiring in one’s 
home. Our Constitution demands that the taking of an individual’s liberty be given the same level 
of concern and care. 
15 Dean Strang and John Skilton. Petition for Supreme Court Rule Amendment 81.02. March 2010. Page 3. Available 
at: https://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/1003petition.pdf. (Last visited March 2015.)
16 Prior to March 2012, Wisconsin had the lowest indigency standard in the country. As noted by the National 
Legal Aid & Defender Association, “The financial eligibility threshold had been set so far below the Federal Poverty 
Guidelines that even a person who was poor enough to qualify for Medicaid coverage or Food Stamps was considered 
by Wisconsin to be able to afford their own defense. In fact, a person who earned more than $3,250 per year was not 
eligible for a court appointed attorney.” NLADA. Gideon Alert, March 16, 2010 at http://www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/
gideon-alert-updates-wisconsin-and-pennsylvania. (Last visited March 2015.) Wis. Stat. § 977.02(3)(c) now sets a 
presumptive threshold at 115% of the Federal Poverty Guideline. 
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In 2002, the American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated 
Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System – a set of ten 
standards that, in the words of the ABA, “constitute the funda-
mental criteria necessary to design a system that provides ef-
fective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal repre-
sentation for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an 
attorney.”17 Former Attorney General Eric Holder stated that 
the ABA “quite literally set the standard”18 for indigent defense 
systems with the Ten Principles, calling them the “basic build-
ing blocks of a well-functioning public defense system.”19
The Ten Principles requires two things of the indigent defense 
system when it comes to assigned counsel compensation. 
Principle 8 states that “[a]ssigned counsel should be paid a 
reasonable fee in addition to actual overhead expenses,”20 
while also specifically banning contract systems that are let 
“primarily on the basis of costs” without regard for “perfor-
mance requirements,” “anticipated workloads,” and additional 
expenses21 – referred to nationally as “flat fee” contracting. 
SPD’s assigned counsel division pays attorneys in one of two 
ways: (1) the $40 hourly rate with no allotment for overhead; 
or, (2) a flat, per-case contracted amount. Both methods fail 
the Ten Principles as detailed below. 
17 American Bar Association. Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery 
System. February 2002. Available at: http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_ten-
principlesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf. (Last visited March 2015.)
18 United States Attorney General Eric Holder. Attorney General Eric 
Holder Speaks at the American Bar Association’s National Summit on 
Indigent Defense. New Orleans ~ Saturday, February 4, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-120204.html. 
(Last visited March 2015.)
19 United States Attorney General Eric Holder. Address to the Department 
of Justice’s National Symposium on Indigent Defense: Looking Back, Looking 
Forward, 2000-2010. Washington, D.C., February 18, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100218.html. (Last 
visited March 2015.)
20 Supra note 17, Commentary to Principle 8 at page 3.
21 Ibid. “Contracts with private attorneys for public defense services 
should never be let primarily on the basis of cost; they should specify per-
formance requirements and the anticipated workload, provide an overflow 
or funding mechanism for excess, unusual, or complex cases, and separate-
ly fund expert, investigative, and other litigation support services.”
A response to our 
survey: 
 
The danger is that because 
of the low rate it also en-
courages people who are 
just doing it for the money 
and have little supervision 
to take cases…and in the 
process of learning, they 
leave a wake of casualties 
behind them. I think the $40 
an hour rate for people who 
are purportedly protecting 
people’s liberty interest is 
really astoundingly cynical.
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FINDINGS 
Finding #1: Wisconsin violates the ABA Ten Principles’ demand that appointed counsel be 
paid both a “reasonable fee” and “actual overhead expenses”
In November of 2013, the Wisconsin State Bar Association published the results of its 2013 Eco-
nomics of Practice Survey.22 For 2012, Wisconsin private practitioners had median total annual 
overhead expenses of $102,050. To calculate an average overhead rate, the annual median expens-
es must be divided by twelve months and then divided again by the number of hours the average 
attorney works in a month. Based on the WSBA survey, the average practitioner spends approx-
imately $8,500.00 on overhead expenses per month.23 The WSBA survey reports that Wisconsin 
attorneys work, on average, 47 hours per week.24 Assuming the average month consists of 4.33 
weeks,25 Wisconsin attorneys work about 204 hours per month.26 This means that the average 
overhead rate in Wisconsin is $41.79,27 or slightly more than the total $40 per hour compensation 
offered by the state.
Because the Wisconsin assigned counsel hourly compensation is not sufficient to cover overhead 
expenses, it is easy to conclude that attorneys are not paid a “reasonable fee” above and beyond 
that. 
To underscore just how a $40 per hour rate does not begin to afford both a reasonable fee and 
coverage of actual overhead expenses, one need only to look at other states that have had their 
assigned counsel compensation rates challenged in court (most of which have significantly lower 
costs-of-living in comparison to Wisconsin):
• Kansas: In 1987, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the State has an “obliga-
tion to pay appointed counsel such sums as will fairly compensate the attorney, not at 
the top rate an attorney might charge, but at a rate which is not confiscatory, consider-
ing overhead and expenses.”28 Testimony was taken in the case that the average over-
head rate of attorneys in Kansas in 1987 was $30 per hour. Kansas now compensates 
public defense attorneys at $80 per hour, or double the rate paid in Wisconsin.29
22 Wisconsin State Bar Association. 2013 Economics of Practice Survey. Results published in Wisconsin Lawyer, No-
vember 2013, Volume 86, Number 9. Available at: http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/
article.aspx?Volume=86&Issue=9&ArticleID=11150. (Last visited March 2015.)
23 $102,050 divided by 12 equals $8,504.17.
24 Supra note 22.
25 Dividing 52 weeks per year by twelve months equals 4.33 weeks per month.
26 Multiplying 47 hours per week by 4.33 weeks per month equals 203.51 hours per month.
27 This figure is calculated by dividing the monthly overhead expenses ($8,504.17) by the average number of hours 
worked per month (203.51 hours). 
28 State Ex Rel Stephen v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kansas S.Ct., 1987).
29 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012 (supra, note 6) lists four Kansas cities in its 
statistical abstract. All four have a cost of living index below the national average: Dodge City (-10.7% below national 
average); Garden City (-10.3%); Hays (-10.6%); and, Salina (-13.1%).
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• Alaska: “We thus conclude that requiring an attorney to represent an indigent criminal 
defendant for only nominal compensation unfairly burdens the attorney by dispropor-
tionately placing the cost of a program intended to benefit the public upon the attorney 
rather than upon the citizenry as a whole.”30 So stated the Alaska Supreme Court in 
1987 in determining that Alaska’s constitution “does not permit the state to deny rea-
sonable compensation to an attorney who is appointed to assist the state in discharging 
its constitutional burden,” because doing so would be taking “private property for a 
public purpose without just compensation.” Importantly – and unlike the Kansas Court 
before them – the Alaska Court determined that appointed cases did not simply merit 
a reasonable fee and overhead, but rather the fair market rate of an average private case. 
The assigned counsel compensation rate was subsequently set at $60 per hour.
• West Virginia: The West Virginia Supreme Court determined in 1989 that court ap-
pointed attorneys in that state were forced to “involuntarily subsidize the State with 
out-of-pocket cash,”31 because the then-current rates did not cover attorney overhead. A 
25-year-old survey of more than 250 West Virginia lawyers who were taking appointed 
cases (i.e., not a survey of all private attorneys, but of only those accepting public cases) 
determined that in 1989 the average hourly overhead was $35 per hour (or, 87.5% of 
Wisconsin’s 2014 payment rate). “Perhaps the most serious defect of the present sys-
tem,” the West Virginia Court determined, “is that the low hourly fee may prompt an 
appointed lawyer to advise a client to plead guilty, although the same lawyer would 
advise a paying client in a similar case to demand a jury trial.” The Court subsequent-
ly raised the hourly rate to cover both a reasonable fee and overhead, setting the rate 
above the current Wisconsin rate at $45 per hour (for out of court work) and $65 per 
hour (for in court representation). West Virginia has a lower cost living than Wiscon-
sin.32
• Mississippi: In 1990, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that indigent defense 
attorneys are entitled to “reimbursement of actual expenses” in addition to a reason-
able sum, and defined “actual expenses” to include “all actual costs to the lawyer for the 
purpose of keeping his or her door open to handle this case.”33 This allows defense at-
torneys in Mississippi to receive a “pro rata share of actual overhead.” As mentioned in 
the introduction to this report, the Mississippi State Bar determined that overhead costs 
25 years ago in that state were $34.86 (or 87% of the total hourly rate that Wisconsin 
defense attorneys make in 2014), although the court eventually settled on an overhead 
rate of $25 per hour.34
30 DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (1987).
31 Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989).
32 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012 (supra, note 6) lists two West Virginia munici-
palities in its statistical abstract. Both have a cost of living index at or below the national average: Martinsburg-Berke-
ley County (-10.4% below national average); Morgantown (0.06 above the national average).
33 Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338 (Miss. S.Ct., 1990).
34 The Court upheld a statute that limited attorney fees and wrote:
Following our rule of statutory construction, we are able to save this statute from unconstitutionality by interpreting 
this language to include reimbursement for all actual costs to the lawyer for the purpose of keeping his or her door 
open to handle this case, i.e., the lawyer will receive a pro rata share of actual overhead. The appellant urges us to 
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• Oklahoma: In the same year as the Mississippi decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
echoed the 1987 Kansas decision in finding that state government “has an obligation to 
pay appointed lawyers sums which will fairly compensate the lawyer, not at the top rate 
which a lawyer might charge, but at a rate which is not confiscatory, after considering 
overhead and expenses.”35 Based on the existing salary structure for Oklahoma district 
attorneys, the Court determined a reasonable appointed counsel fee to be between 
$14.63 and $29.26 (based on experience) and “[a]s a matter of course, when the dis-
trict attorneys’ … salaries are raised by the Legislature so, too, would the hourly rate of 
compensation for defense counsel.” In addition to this reasonable fee, and in order “to 
place the counsel for the defense on an equal footing with counsel for the prosecution,” 
the Oklahoma Court also determined that a “provision must be made for compensation 
of defense counsel’s reasonable overhead and out of pocket expenses.” The Court found 
that the two lawyers involved in the case at dispute should be paid their actual overhead 
costs. The overhead costs for the Oklahoma attorneys in 1989 were respectively $50.88 
per hour and $48.00 per hour. This is in addition to the reasonable fee, making the total 
compensation rate between $62.63 and $80.14.36 And Oklahoma has a significantly 
lower cost of living than Wisconsin.37
• New York: Announcing in 2003 that “[e]qual access to justice should not be a cere-
monial platitude, but a perpetual pledge vigilantly guarded,”38 the Supreme Court for 
the County of New York ordered the City and State to compensate assigned counsel 
attorneys at $90 per hour – an increase from the $40-per-hour rate they were being 
paid. The Court determined that the $40-per-hour rate paid to panel attorneys was 
adopt a figure of $ 34.86 per hour for overhead. This figure is derived from a survey conducted by the Mississippi 
State Bar in 1988. See, 35 Mississippi Lawyer, No. 5, at 45 (March-April 1989). However, we choose rather to adopt 
a $25.00 per hour figure, which is also based on the survey. For ease of administration and to avoid a lot of satellite 
litigation, we create a rebuttable presumption that a court appointed attorney’s actual overhead within the statute 
is $25.00 per hour. However, the trial court is bound by this only in the absence of actual proof to the contrary -- proof 
offered by the lawyer that it is more or by the State that it is less. (Emphasis added.)
It is important to note that Mississippi sets a statutory cap on the total payments possible to appointed attorneys, for 
example, $1000 for a felony case, plus “actual expenses.” MS Code § 99-15-17 (2013). The Legislature has directed the 
State Office of the Public Defender to “coordinate the collection and dissemination of statistical data and make such 
reports as are required of the divisions, develop plans and proposals for further development of a statewide public 
defender system in coordination with the Mississippi Public Defenders Task Force.” (Miss. Code Ann. § 99-18-1.)
35 State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Oklahoma S.Ct., 1990). Available at: https://www.courtlistener.com/okla/7tsU/
state-v-lynch/. (Last visited March 2015.)
36 In 1991, the high attorney compensation rate hastened the creation of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System – a 
state-funded agency in the executive branch that provides trial-level, appellate and post-conviction criminal defense 
representation to the indigent accused in 75 of the state’s 77 counties. Both Tulsa County (Tulsa) and Oklahoma 
County (Oklahoma City) established public defender offices prior to statewide reform and were allowed to continue 
to provide services outside of the OIDS system.
37 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012 (supra, note 6) lists six Oklahoma cities in its 
statistical abstract. All six have a cost of living index below the national average: Ardmore (-12.7% below the national 
average); Muskogee (-14%); Ponca City (-10%); Pryor Creek (-15.5%); Stillwater (-9.9%); and, Tulsa (-11.6%).
38 N.Y. County Lawyer’s Ass’n v. State, 192 Misc. 2d 424, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). The trial court (cited here) handed 
down its judgment in February 2003, available here: http://www.sado.org/fees/newyorkfeecase.pdf. (Last visited 
March 2015.)
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“insufficient to cover even normal hourly overhead expenses,” which the Court pegged 
at approximately $35 per hour. Deriding the “pusillanimous posturing and procrastina-
tion of the executive and legislative branches” for failing to raise the rate for more than 
17 years, the Court determined that the other two branches of government created an 
assigned counsel “crisis” that impairs the “judiciary’s ability to function.” The low com-
pensation was found to result “in denial of counsel, delay in the appointment of coun-
sel, and less than meaningful and effective legal representation.” The following year, the 
rate was statutorily amended to $75 per hour.39
• Alabama: In 1993, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined in May v. 
State40 that indigent defense attorneys were entitled to overhead expenses (set at $30 per 
hour) in addition to a reasonable fee.41 When the Attorney General in that state issued 
an opinion against paying the overhead rate and the state comptroller subsequently 
stopped paying it, the issue was litigated all the way to the Alabama Supreme Court 
(2006). In Wright v Childree,42 the Alabama Supreme Court determined that assigned 
counsel are entitled to a reasonable fee in addition to overhead expenses.43 After this 
litigation, the Alabama Legislature increased the hourly rate to $70 per hour.44
Although it is not the result of litigation, it should also be mentioned that in 2000, the South 
Dakota Supreme Court set public counsel compensation hourly rates at $67 per hour. To ensure 
that attorneys were perpetually paid both a reasonable fee and overhead, the Court also mandated 
that “court-appointed attorney fees will increase annually in an amount equal to the cost of living 
increase that state employees receive each year from the legislature.” Assigned counsel compen-
sation in South Dakota now stands at $90 per hour45 – more than double the pay for attorneys in 
Wisconsin.46
39 NY CLS Jud § 35.
40 May v. State, 672 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
41 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012 (supra, note 6) lists four Alabama municipal-
ities in its statistical abstract: Decatur-Hartselle has a cost of living that is -10.8% below national average; Dothan 
(-10.2%); Florence (-9.8%); and, Montgomery (-0.8%).
42 Wright v. Childree, 972 So. 2d 771 (Ala. 2006). This was a statutory analysis of a statute that provided: “Counsel 
shall also be entitled to be reimbursed for any expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of his or her client, to be 
approved in advance by the trial court.” Ala. Code 1975 § 15-12-21.
43 See: Attorney’s Fee Declaration for cases after June 14, 2014, at: http://oids.alabama.gov/Forms/AFD-2%20
Adult%20After%206142011%20Rev1.pdf. (Last visited March 2015.)
44 Code of Ala. § 15-12-21 provides: 
Counsel shall also be entitled to be reimbursed for any nonoverhead expenses reasonably incurred in the represen-
tation of his or her client, with any expense in excess of three hundred dollars ($300) subject to advance approval 
by the trial court as necessary for the indigent defense services and as a reasonable cost or expense. Reimbursable 
expenses shall not include overhead expenses. Fees and expenses of all experts, investigators, and others rendering 
indigent defense services to be used by counsel for an indigent defendant shall be approved in advance by the trial 
court as necessary for the indigent defense services and as a reasonable cost or expense. Retrials of any case shall be 
considered a new case for billing purposes. Upon review, the director may authorize interim payment of the attorney 
fees or expenses, or both.
45 Memorandum to 1st Circuit Attorneys and County Commissioners, December 16, 2014.  See: http://www.ujs.
sd.gov/uploads/firstcircuit/Court_Appointed_Attorney_Fee_Memo.pdf. (Last visited April 2015.)
46 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012 (supra, note 6) does not list any South Dakota 
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Indeed, even in Wisconsin, the state supreme court has authorized payment of $70 per hour for 
attorneys appointed directly by lower courts in those instances where the SPD has a conflict in 
which neither the primary public defender system nor the assigned counsel system can ethically 
represent a client (e.g., multiple defendant cases where not enough assigned counsel attorneys are 
available).47 This rate has been in place for approximately 20 years.48
And, it is not solely state courts that have taken on this issue. A number of state legislatures have 
also dealt with the issue. Recognizing that the NACDL report has firmly established Wisconsin 
to have the lowest compensation rates in the nation, we note that other more rural states have in-
vested the authority to set attorney compensation rates in an independent statewide commission 
(akin to the SPD in Wisconsin). For example, the statewide commissions in both Arkansas ($60-
$80)49 and North Dakota ($75)50 have established assigned counsel rates that far exceed Wiscon-
sin’s and encompass both a reasonable fee and overhead expenses. Both states have a cost of living 
below that of Wisconsin.51
Finding #2: Wisconsin violates the ABA Ten Principles’ prohibition on contracts let primarily 
on cost
ABA Principle 8 does not support flat fee contracts because they are rife with conflicts of interest 
between lawyer and defendant. As noted in standards promulgated by the National Legal Aid & 
Defender Association, fixed fee contracts that require lawyers to be paid “the same amount, no 
matter how much or little he works on each case” cause conflicts because it is in the lawyer’s “per-
sonal interest to devote as little time as possible to each appointed case, leaving more time for the 
lawyer to do other more lucrative work.”52
municipalities by which to compare with Wisconsin.
47 The rule reads:
SCR 81.02 Compensation. 
(1) Except as provided under sub. (1m), attorneys appointed by any court to provide legal services for that court, for 
judges sued in their official capacity, for indigents and for boards, commissions and committees appointed by the 
supreme court shall be compensated at the rate of $70 per hour or a higher rate set by the appointing authority. The 
Supreme Court shall review the specified rate of compensation every two years. 
(1m) Any provider of legal services may contract for the provision of legal services at less than the rate of compensa-
tion under sub. (1). 
(2) The rate specified in sub. (1) applies only to services performed after July 1, 1994. 
48 “If lawyers are unavailable or unwilling to represent indigent clients at the SPD rate of $40 per hour, or when 
clients do not qualify under existing SPD eligibility standards but nonetheless are unable financially to retain coun-
sel, judges then must appoint lawyers at county expense.” See State v. Dean, 163 Wis. 2d 503, 471 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. 
App. 1991). Also see: In the matter of the petition to amend Supreme Court Rule 81.02 (June 2011), at: https://www.
wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=67390. (Last visited March 2015.)
49 Arkansas Code Ann. §16-87-211.
50 N. Dak. Cent. Code §54-61-02(a)(1).
51 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012 (supra, note 6) lists three Arkansas municipali-
ties in its statistical abstract: Conway has a cost of living that is -13.4% below national average; Fort Smith (-13.9%); 
and Jonesboro (-11.1%). Only one North Dakota city is listed in the same document. Minot, North Dakota is margin-
ally below the national cost of living average: (-0.01%).
52 NLADA web page on Flat Fee Contracts, at: http://www.nlada.net/library/article/na_flatfeecontracts. (Last visited 
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As of February 2014, SPD employed 58 fixed-fee contracts 
compensating attorneys at a rate between $248 and $362 per 
case (depending on the county).53 These Wisconsin contractu-
al arrangements produce financial incentives to triage work in 
favor of some defendants, but in detriment of others.
Using the $41.75 per hour overhead rate calculated above, an 
attorney paid $248 per misdemeanor case will begin to lose 
money within the first six hours worth of work performed 
on the case (and would not have any net income from the 
fee).54 So, what if the attorney wants to earn some money 
and, on average, disposes of the cases within five hours time? 
Under that scenario, the attorneys’ overhead costs would be 
$208.75.55 This leaves a “reasonable” fee of just $39.25.56 Spread 
over the five hours worth of work, the attorney is working at a 
rate of $7.85 (or slightly more than minimum wage).57 Work-
ing to complete the average job in three hours means that an 
attorney expends $125.25 in overhead costs, netting $122.75 
for him or herself. This equates to working at a rate of approx-
imately $41 per hour – approaching a reasonable “reasonable 
fee” based on the rates of other states. There is a clear financial 
incentive to the attorney to limit what is done on a case in or-
der to make it profitable, all to the detriment of the defendant.
But, can an attorney ethically dispose of the average misde-
meanor case in just three hours? No matter how complex or 
basic a case may seem at the outset, there are certain funda-
mental tasks each attorney must be able to do for each and 
every client in advance of the plea. Even in the average mis-
July 2014). In the Guidelines for Negotiating and Awarding Governmental 
Contracts for Criminal Defense Services, written by NLADA and adopted 
by the ABA in 1985, Guideline III-13 similarly prohibits contracts under 
which payment of expenses for necessary services such as investigations, 
expert witnesses, and transcripts would “decrease the Contractor’s income 
or compensation to attorneys or other personnel,” because this situation 
creates a conflict of interest between attorney and client.  
53 Covering approximately 10,000 cases.
54 If the $248 flat misdemeanor case rate is divided by the average hourly 
overhead rate of $41.75, the result is that an attorney begins losing money 
after 5.94 hours put into a case.
55 Calculated by multiplying the hourly overhead rate of $41.75 by five 
hours ($41.75 x 5 hours = $208.75). 
56 Calculated by subtracting $208.75 from the $248 flat per case rate.
57 Calculated by dividing $39.25 by five hours. The minimum wage in 
Wisconsin stands at $7.25. See U.S. Department of Labor, at: http://www.
dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#content. (Last visited March 2015.) 
A response to our 
survey: 
 
Because of the low hourly 
rate, I take almost no SPD 
cases anymore. Maybe one 
per year, and only those 
which require my “niche” 
experience, like homicides, 
DNA or other scientific cases. 
The hourly rate is so pitiful 
I view them as largely pro 
bono and don’t even bother 
to bill all my time, as it’s not 
worth the (unbillable) time 
effort to do so.
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The State Bar of Wisconsin, Marquette Law 
School, the University of Wisconsin Law School, 
and the Wisconsin Attorney General created 
the Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Com-
mission (WCJSC)1 “to identify and help correct 
problems in the Wisconsin criminal justice 
system.”  WCJSC is comprised of “well-respect-
ed criminal justice professionals from every 
facet of the system, including prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, judges, police, and victim’s 
advocates, as well as community leaders from 
outside the system.” 
The WCJSC debated the assigned counsel 
compensation rates several times at meetings 
between August 2005 and December 2008.2 
State Public Defender Kelli Thompson iden-
tified a “crisis” in Wisconsin indigent defense 
due to the low rate of compensation for 
private attorneys accepting assigned cases, 
noting that in the smaller counties there were 
often no attorneys who would take the cases, 
and that in the larger counties the attorneys 
that took assigned cases were young and inex-
perienced.3
At the February 22, 2008 meeting, Commission 
member Jerry Buting noted that the current 
rate of compensation for assigned counsel led 
to difficulties in finding attorneys to take as-
signed cases.4 Mr. Buting also pointed out that 
1 See: http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/clinicals/ip/wcjsc/
index.html. (Last visited March 2015.)
2 Meeting agendas and summaries are found at: http://
law.wisc.edu/fjr/clinicals/ip/wcjsc/meetings.html. (Last 
visited March 2015.)
3 November 27, 2007 summary of Commission meeting 
at 8. 
4 February 22, 2008 summary at 1.
half of the attorneys disciplined by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court are on the SPD’s private bar 
list.5
Judge Fred Fleishauer reported that, in Portage 
County, the private bar lawyers doing criminal 
appointments worked from home with no 
staff and a lack of resources, which led to those 
lawyers being unable to investigate their cases, 
research the law, and file motions.6 The judge 
described the lawyers as “plea negotiators,” 
rather than proper defenders, due to the low 
rate of pay and lack of resources.7
At the May 29, 2008 meeting, SPD Budget 
Director Megan Christiansen reported that the 
SPD contracts with approximately 1,100 attor-
neys throughout the state for overflow and 
conflict cases, with 47% of its cases appointed 
to private attorneys.8 These cases account for 
less than one third of the SPD’s total budget.9 
She further noted that, of the 205 Wisconsin 
lawyers disciplined in 2005, 58% were on or 
had recently been on the SPD’s private bar 
list.10
A review of the reports of the Commission’s 
meetings suggests that there was a consensus 
among prosecutors, law enforcement, defense 
attorneys, and judges that there was a crisis in 
public defense and that the assigned counsel 
rate should be increased.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, at 4.
7 Ibid.
8 May 29, 2008, summary at 1.
9 Ibid, at 2.
10 Ibid, at 1.
Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Commission expresses 
concern with low rates of compensation
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demeanor case, the attorney must be able to, among other tasks: meet with and interview the 
client; attempt to secure pretrial release if the client remains in state custody (but, before doing 
so, learn from the client what conditions of release are most favorable); keep the client informed 
throughout the duration of proceedings; prepare for and appear at the arraignment, wherein he 
must preserve his client’s rights; request and review formal and informal discovery; launch an 
investigation, scouring all sources of potential investigative information in the process, as soon as 
possible; research the law; develop and continually reassess the theory of the case; file and argue 
pretrial motions; read and respond to the prosecution’s motions; negotiate plea options with the 
prosecution, including sentencing outcomes; all the while preparing for the event that the case 
may go to trial and possibly sentencing.58 Although lawyers in some cases may dispose of a misde-
meanor ethically in under three hours, the majority of cases should take longer.
For example, in January 2014, the ABA published its most recent report on public defense work-
load.59 The report determined that “to provide reasonable effective assistance of counsel,”60 the 
average Missouri lawyer needs to spend 11.7 hours to dispose of the average misdemeanor case 
through a plea deal. Applying this analysis to Wisconsin, the state of Wisconsin would have to pay 
attorneys nearly $490 per misdemeanor case just to cover overhead.
Several states have recently prohibited fixed fee contracting altogether because of the financial 
conflicts of interest they generate. For example, Idaho requires that representation shall be pro-
vided through a public defender office or by contracting with a private defense attorney “provided 
that the terms of the contract shall not include any pricing structure that charges or pays a single 
fixed fee for the services and expenses of the attorney.”61 Similarly, the Michigan Legislature creat-
ed a statewide public defender commission in the 2013 legislative session, called the Michigan In-
digent Defense Commission (MIDC). In establishing minimum standards, rules, and procedures, 
the MIDC is statutorily barred from approving indigent defense plans that provide “economic 
disincentives” and statute further states that “incentives that impair defense counsel’s ability to 
provide effective representation shall be avoided.”62
Other states have barred flat fee contracting through judicial rules. For example, the South Dako-
ta Unified Judicial System Policy 1-PJ-10, issued by the state supreme court, not only set a reason-
able hourly rate that “will increase annually in an amount equal to the cost of living increase that 
state employees receive each year from the legislature,”63 but also bans flat fee contracting.64
58 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll on America’s 
Broken Misdemeanor Courts. April 2009. See page 22. Available at: https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/. 
(Last visited March 2015.)
59 American Bar Association. The Missouri Project: A Study of the Missouri Defender System and Attorney Workload 
Standards. Prepared by RubinBrown LLP on behalf of the ABA, Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent 
Defendants. Available at: http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/
ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf. (Last visited March 2015.)
60 Ibid, at page 6.
61 I.C. § 19-859 (codified in 2014).
62 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 780.991 (2)(b).
63 Supra, note 45.
64 UJS Policy 1-PJ-10 requires that “[a]ll lawyers . . . be paid for all legal services on an hourly basis” thereby ban-
ning the use of flat fee contracting for public counsel services. Ibid.
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Finally, a Federal Court in 2013 called the use of very low rate 
flat fee contracts in two cities in Washington State prior to the 
Supreme Court ban an “intentional choice” that purposefully 
“left the defenders compensated at such a paltry level that even 
a brief meeting [with clients] at the outset of the representa-
tion would likely make the venture unprofitable.”65 Whether or 
not Wisconsin’s policymakers similarly made an “intentional 
choice” to create financial conflicts of interest in the delivery 
of constitutional right to counsel services cannot be decided 
here. However, it is clear that financial conflicts have a num-
ber of impacts on the delivery of right to counsel services, as 
detailed in Finding #3 below.
Finding #3: Unreasonably low attorney compensation rates 
interfere with a lawyers’ ethical obligation to give undivided 
loyalty to each and every defendant
At the July 2000 meeting of the ABA, the House of Delegates 
adopted a resolution reaffirming the core values of the legal 
profession.66 The resolution calls on lawyers to maintain “un-
divided loyalty” to the client and to “avoid conflicts of interest” 
with the client. The ABA resolution expands upon the core 
values first established in 1983 in its Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct. Rule 5.4(c) states that a lawyer shall not permit a 
person that pays the lawyer to render legal services for another 
to “regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering 
such legal services.”67 The Model Rules have since been adopted 
by the state bar associations in 49 of 50 states, plus the District 
of Columbia (including Wisconsin).68
65 United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle. 
Memorandum of Decision in Wilbur v. Mount Vernon. No. C11-1100RSL, at 
15. December 2013. Judge Robert Lasnik. Available at: http://sixthamend-
ment.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Wilbur-Decision.pdf. 
66 ABA House of Delegates. Resoultion 10-F. July 2000. Available at: 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/leadership/2000dailyjournal10.html. 
(Last visited March 2015.)
67 American Bar Association. Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 2013. 
Available at: http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibil-
ity/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html. (Last visited March 2015.)
68 Failure to adhere to the bar rules of each state may result in disci-
plinary action against the attorney – even loss of license to practice law.
A response to our 
survey: 
 
With the way funding works, 
there is so much that has 
to be preapproved . . . that 
becomes a timing issue. If I 
have to get permission to or-
der transcript or something 
not provided in discovery, 
timing wise that adds up 
and I end up spending more 
time on administrative, 
unbillable work and it is a 
huge hassle. I think that is 
what adds to perception 
(even among public defend-
ers) that PD cases are not 
worthwhile because you are 
not paid well enough. If you 
have 2 files on your desk, 
one pays $40 and the pri-
vate pays $250/300 an hour, 
which one are you going to 
pick up first and put more 
effort into? The answer is 
obvious.
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Moreover, there is a constitutional imperative for defender representation to be independent and 
free from undue interference on a lawyer’s professional judgment. In the 1979 case, Ferri v. Ack-
erman, the United States Supreme Court determined that “independence” of appointed counsel 
to act as an adversary is an “indispensible element” of “effective representation.”69 Two years later, 
the Court determined in Polk County v. Dodson that states have a “constitutional obligation to 
respect the professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages.”70 Observing that 
“a defense lawyer best serves the public not by acting on the State’s behalf or in concert with it, but 
rather by advancing the undivided interests of the client,”71 the Court concluded in Polk County 
that a “public defender is not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other 
state employees.”72
This is confirmed in Strickland v. Washington.73 In that case, the Court states that “independence 
of counsel” is “constitutionally protected,” and that “[g]overnment violates the right to effective 
assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent deci-
sions about how to conduct the defense.”74
69 Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979). Available at: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_5981. 
(Last visited March 2015.) 
70 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). Available at: 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_80_824. (Last visited March 2015.)
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). Available at: 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1554. (Last visited March 2015.)
74 Ibid.
“Private Bar Compensation - The State Bar of 
Wisconsin supports private practice lawyers’ 
compensation for assigned counsel appoint-
ments at a rate that fairly compensates lawyers 
for their time, travel and any other costs asso-
ciated with providing quality representation to 
their clients. Rates of compensation should be 
at least as much as those set by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court for court-appointed attor-
neys. A rate of compensation less than that 
set by the Wisconsin Supreme Court for court 
appointed attorneys does not safeguard the 
constitutional rights of individuals accused of 
committing a crime. The State can guarantee 
constitutional safeguards by providing fair and 
timely reimbursements to private bar attorneys 
to ensure a more efficient and effective crimi-
nal justice system.”1
1 See: http://www.wisbar.org/aboutus/governmentre-
lations/pages/policy-positions.aspx. (Last visited March 
2015.)
State Bar of Wisconsin Board of Governors Policy Position 
(April 2013):
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Both unreasonable compensation with no allowances for overhead expenses and flat fee contrac-
tual arrangements to represent the poor in criminal courts are constitutional violations precisely 
because each pits the attorney’s financial well-being against the client’s right to conflict-free repre-
sentation. A lawyer can be pushed into thinking about how to make the representation profitable 
in addition to, and potentially in opposition to, the stated interest of the client.
To discover whether such negative impacts exist in Wisconsin in relation to the low attorney com-
pensation rate, the authors of this report conducted a survey of Wisconsin lawyers. The survey 
was sent electronically to 1,277 criminal defense attorneys, using lists provided by WACDL and 
the SPD. These lists include attorneys currently taking cases and those that no longer take cases 
for whatever reason. E-mail analytics show that 166 bounced back as having wrong email ad-
dresses. This means that 1,111 surveys were sent with 378 people filling out the survey (a 34% 
response rate).
Nearly one half of respondents (49.4%) stated that they represent fewer public defender appointed 
clients than in the past. This is in addition to the 6.8% of respondents stating that they no longer 
take SPD appointed cases at all.75 These results confirm what SPD reported its 2013-2015 Biennial 
Budget Issue Paper: “Although there are currently about 1,100 lawyers on the appointment lists, 
about 25% of them take less than five cases per year and more than 10% take one or less cases per 
year.”76
This is important because there appear to be two distinct classes of appointed attorneys: (a) those 
attorneys that take occasional cases (perhaps out of a self-perceived duty to the Court or SPD); 
and (b) those lawyers that represent a significant number of SPD defendants. But, before delving 
deeper into that divide it is important to note that regardless of how many SPD cases an attorney 
takes on annually, the survey showed that Wisconsin attorneys spend, on average, about 13% less 
time working on their appointed cases than on similar retained cases.
A lawyer must be appointed early to represent the accused so that she can work with the client to 
develop the level of trust that is essential to her ability to be effective – what the Supreme Court 
has described as “those necessary conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes 
partake of the inviolable character of the confessional.”77 However, surveyed attorneys reported 
that they spend 37% less time, on average, meeting with their appointed clients than they do with 
their retained clients. 
Motions are a vitally important component of an attorney’s litigation strategy. Where the gov-
ernment’s evidence was acquired through an unlawful search, as one example, a defense lawyer’s 
motion can suppress such evidence, thereby increasing the chances of a better plea offer from the 
prosecution or maybe even obtaining a dismissal of the charges entirely. As the judge in the Fed-
eral lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the indigent defense services in two Washington 
75 A quarter of the attorneys state that the number has remained the same. 18.5% say that they’ve increased the 
number of appointed cases they have accepted.
76 SPD, 2013-2015 Biennial Budget Issue Paper, provided to authors by SPD staff.
77 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Available at: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1901-1939/1932/1932_98. (Last 
visited March 2015.)
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cities noted, “no hard and fast number of pretrial motions or trials is expected,” but when hardly 
any motions are ever filed and the number of trials is “incredibly small” it is a “sign of a deeper 
systemic problem.”78 The Wisconsin survey revealed that attorneys who have a higher number of 
public defender cases tend not to file motions in their cases, and they are more likely to resolve 
cases by their public defender clients pleading to the offense charged. This suggests that attorneys 
with many SPD cases are prioritizing speed in order to make representation more profitable.   
Even if that is not the conscious intent, the pressure of having to make a living can have that 
effect.
Conversely, the data suggest that those attorneys who take on fewer public defender cases in favor 
of private clients file more motions for both their private clients and public defender clients. These 
attorneys tend to spend more time working on their public defender cases, meet with them more 
often, see their cases more often result in acquittal, and are less likely to resolve cases with guilty 
pleas as charged.
Finding #4: Separation of powers concerns do not prevent the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
from increasing assigned counsel rates through judicial rule
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was created to prevent the tyrannical impulses of 
big government from taking away an individual’s liberty without the process being fair. It does not 
solely apply in good economic times. 
Despite this, there is some evidence that financial considerations may have trumped the con-
stitutional imperative for independent, conflict-free representation in Wisconsin. In 2011, the 
Wisconsin Court expressed concern about the adequacy of assigned counsel fees in the context 
of a petition to amend Supreme Court Rule 81.02.79 The Petition asked the Court to increase the 
court-appointed rate to $80, tie it to the Consumer Price Index, and provide that SPD-appointed 
rates be not less than the Rule 81.02 rates.80 Despite the Court’s “sincere concern” and recognition 
of the “extensive anecdotal evidence” that “shortfalls may compromise the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel”81 in Wisconsin, the Court denied the petition, in part, because of “a particularly 
challenging budgetary environment” for the legislature. 
If the Court is worried about separation of powers concerns, it need not be. The Court has inher-
ent power to ensure the effective administration of justice in the State of Wisconsin.82 Although 
the legislature holds the power to pass budgets, an expenditure policy that creates a financial con-
flict of interest in which the constitutional right to counsel is compromised cannot be allowed to 
stand. The Court should not fear that passing a court rule increasing pay will necessarily result in 
forcing the legislature to expend more money. The Wisconsin legislature can, for instance, work 
together to increase the reliance on diversion that could move juvenile and adult defendants out 
78 Supra, note 65.
79 Supra, notes 14 and 47.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 See, e.g., State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995).
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SPD Budget Director Megan Christiansen 
reported that of the 205 Wisconsin lawyers 
disciplined in 2005, 58% were on or had 
recently been on the SPD’s private bar list.1 
The pattern seems to be continuing. For 
example, in 2012 one attorney was rep-
rimanded for not taking action and not 
communicating with the client in three 
post-conviction matters appointed by SPD 
in 2007 and 2008. This attorney was on the 
SPD certified bar list in 2012 and in 2013 
until he was suspended from the list in 
March of that year. A new lawyer regula-
tion case against him was filed on January 
2, 2014.2
In 2010, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
reprimanded a different attorney for 
“representing an individual on criminal 
charges in which he had previously con-
sulted with the victim in the criminal case 
1 Spreadsheet of certified attorneys provided by SPD 
staff.
2 The identity of this lawyer, as with each of the others 
selected as examples in this section, has been withheld. 
Transcripts of all disciplinary hearings before the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation are readily available at: https://www.
wicourts.gov/services/public/lawyerreg/statuspublic.htm. 
The authors found all subsequent quotes from disci-
plinary proceedings therein.
about a potential civil action against the 
person he ultimately represented in the 
criminal matter.” The Court found that this 
“reflects a troubling lack of awareness of or 
attention to the rights of his clients or his 
responsibility as a lawyer to guard sensi-
tive information with which he had been 
entrusted.” This was the attorney’s third 
reprimand. His first reprimand was because 
he was convicted for failure to file a tax 
return. In 2012, his license was suspend-
ed for 60 days because he failed to keep 
a retained client “reasonably informed 
about the status of her case and failed 
to promptly respond to her request for 
information about fees. He also acknowl-
edges that he failed to timely take steps to 
withdraw from representation after L.P. left 
numerous messages saying she wanted to 
discharge him.” This thrice-repremanded 
lawyer was on the SPD certified private bar 
list as of November 13, 2013.
In 2011, yet another attorney was repri-
manded as the result of criminal convic-
tions for participating in two bar fights. As 
the Supreme Court described it, “In each 
instance, [the attorney] punched a bar 
patron multiple times in the face, causing 
Examples of disciplinary actions against SPD assigned 
counsel attorneys
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injuries. [The attorney] fled the scene after 
each incident.” The lawyer was on the SPD 
appointment list in 
2012 but not in 2013.
In 2012, another law-
yer was reprimanded 
because of his miscon-
duct in a juvenile case 
appointed to him by 
SPD. This attorney also 
had a prior conviction, 
having pled guilty to a 
class A misdemeanor 
involving the issuance 
of a worthless check in 
an amount less than 
$1,000, in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 943.23 
(1). The Court found 
that this attorney had 
violated SCR 20:3.4(c) 
by failing to honor a 
lawfully served subpoena commanding his 
attendance at a hearing alleging his inef-
fective assistance of counsel and that he 
had violated SCRs 22.03(6) and 20:8.4(h) by 
a misrepresentation to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation. This attorney was on the SPD 
certified private bar list as of November 13, 
2013.
In 2012, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court revoked 
the license of a different 
lawyer, in part because 
he had been convict-
ed of felony theft “for 
billing the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender’s 
Office for 691 hours 
of work that he never 
performed, consist-
ing of 628 fraudulent 
billing entries in more 
than 40 client matters 
over a nearly four-year 
period, and for which 
he received more than 
$19,600.” He had been 
publicly reprimanded in 
1995 for “failing to provide competent and 
diligent representation of a client and for 
failing to communicate with a client in a 
criminal appeal matter.“
In Amy W. v. David G. (In re 
Alexandria G.), 2013 WI App 83 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2013), the court 
granted a habeas corpus peti-
tion and allowed an extended 
time to file an appeal because 
the appointed appellate counsel’s 
performance was both deficient 
and prejudicial. After an initial 
consultation, counsel failed to 
consult with her client about the 
appeal or to file an appeal before 
the deadline for filing had passed.
Case law indicates that 
there is reason for concern 
about the effectiveness of 
SPD-appointed counsel
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of the formal criminal justice system and provide help with potential drug or other dependencies. 
Similarly, lawmakers can change low-level, non-serious crimes to “citations” – in which the of-
fender is given a ticket to pay a fine rather than being threatened with jail time thus triggering the 
constitutional right to counsel.83 By shrinking the size of the criminal justice system, Wisconsin’s 
funding requirements under the right to counsel could be mitigated, even with increased rates of 
pay for attorneys.
It is easy for policymakers, especially in hard economic times, to say that they do not want to give 
more taxpayer resources to lawyers. But if the failure to pay a reasonable rate creates financial 
conflicts of interests that result in lawyers triaging the Sixth Amendment duty they owe to some 
clients in favor of others, then Wisconsin is in violation of the U.S. Constitution – a situation the 
policymakers may want to address to avoid costly systemic litigation. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court should amend Rule 81.02 to increase the court-appointed rate to 
$85. This includes an overhead rate of $41.79, plus a reasonable fee of $43.21. The Court should 
require that the rate be increased in conjunction with either (a) the cost of living increases given 
for state government workers, or (b) the annual increase in the Consumer Price Index. The Court 
should require that SPD-appointed counsel rates be not less than the Rule 81.02 rates. Finally, the 
Court should ban all indigent defense contracts that interfere with a lawyer’s professional inde-
pendent judgment through economic incentives or disincentives.
83 For example, jurisdictions in Washington State have developed diversion programs for suspended driver license 
cases, resulting in reducing caseloads by one-third. See, Robert C. Boruchowitz, Fifty Years After Gideon: It is Long 
Past Time to Provide Lawyers for Misdemeanor Defendants Who Cannot Afford to Hire Their Own, 11 Seattle Journal 
for Social Justice 891, 922(2013).
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